Although the Greek concept of kairos (καιρός) has undergone a recent renewal of interest among scholars of Renaissance rhetoric, this revival has not yet been paralleled by its reception into the history of political thought. This article examines the meanings and uses of this important concept within the ancient Greek tradition, particularly in the works of Isocrates and Plutarch, in order to understand how it is employed by two of the most important political thinkers of the sixteenth century: Thomas Elyot and Niccolò Machiavelli. Through such an investigation this paper argues that an appreciation of the concept of kairos and its use by Renaissance political writers provides a fuller understanding of the political philosophy of the period.
INTRODUCTION
The ancient Greek concept of kairos (καιρός) has recently undergone a revival of interest among historians of rhetoric. 1 These scholars detail the importance that ancient writers placed on the concept of kairos as denoting both a sense of "adaptation and accommodation to convention" and, conversely, "the uniquely timely, the spontaneous, the radically particular." 2 They point to the prevalence of the first sense, often captured in the Latin concept of decorum, from the time of Cicero onward, and especially in the Renaissance. Although involving the same understanding of adaptation to circumstance as kairos, decorum was highly moral -synthesizing the ends of utile and honestum in any given action -whereas kairos carried connotations of moral flexibility, even moral relativism. It is the moralized decorum that dominated much of medieval and Renaissance rhetoric, and has held the attention of historians of the period ever since. In the words of James Kinneavy, the pioneering scholar on kairos in the Anglophone tradition, "although the Ciceronian notion of propriety persisted throughout the medieval and Renaissance period, the residual influence of kairos is almost a negligible chapter in the history of rhetoric since antiquity." 3 Although work has been done in recent decades to counter this view, the revival of the study of kairos in rhetoric has not yet been paralleled by its reception into the history of political thought. 4 
2
As recent scholarship has shown, an understanding of the various elements in the classical ars rhetorica greatly illuminates a reading of political texts, especially in the Renaissance. 5 Kairos as a rhetorical theory -an understanding of how, and more importantly, when to speak in a given context -thus has a fundamental role to play in Renaissance political philosophy, especially given its preoccupation with questions of political counsel. 6 This paper will begin by focusing on the use of the kairotic tradition by one of England's leading humanists of the sixteenth century, Thomas Elyot (ca.
1490-1546), in his 1533
Pasquil the Playne, a dialogue on the problem of giving appropriate political advice. In Pasquil, Elyot deliberately recalls the Greek tradition of kairos, and designates the ability to adopt an understanding of kairotic speech as the key talent of the effective political adviser.
As kairos is essential to rhetoric, and rhetoric essential to Renaissance political philosophy, kairos ought to form an important part of an evaluation of the period's political thought. The political influence of kairos, however, does not end with well-timed political speech, for kairos also sets out a model of political action, both for Greek and for Renaissance writers. This theory is best explored in one of the sixteenth century's most influential political theorists, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). In The Prince, written in 1513 and published posthumously in 1532, Machiavelli emphasizes the importance of a knowledge of occasione to his prince, without which his virtù will go to waste. This concept of occasione bears clear relation to that of kairos in the Greek tradition, a fact recognized by commentators in the decades that followed as they further developed a political theory founded on the concept of kairos.
In order to understand Elyot's and Machiavelli's use of kairos, this paper starts with an account of the history of the concept, including its etymology and earliest uses in Sophistic and Platonic philosophy, before moving on to its place in the works of two of the most prominent Greek philosophers of kairos, and Plutarch (ca. 46-120 CE). 7 Analyzing kairos in political speech and political action separately, the influence of the Greek tradition is shown first in Elyot's Pasquil, before moving on to an examination of the ways in which Machiavelli too draws directly on the philosophies of Isocrates and Plutarch, especially regarding the lessons of seizing opportunity, of necessity, of moral flexibility, and the study of comparable historical moments. Finally, this paper ends 3 by gesturing toward the political tradition of kairos in the works of late sixteenth-century thinkers, especially those associated with the spread of Machiavellianism and reason of state. By grasping the complex history of kairos in the classical (and especially Greek) works embraced in the Renaissance, a political theory of kairos emerges that is fundamental to a fuller understanding of Renaissance political thought.
ETYMOLOGY AND USES OF KAIROS
The word kairos has its roots in archery, where it denoted a "penetrable opening, an aperture" through which Greek archers aimed, simulating the forest of shields and armor through which an arrow must pass to reach its target. 8 This origin explains the many meanings of kairos, such as mark and target, both literally, as in the Iliad where it indicates a place on the body to strike fatally, 9 and figuratively, such as in Sophocles's Electra, in which Orestes urges "Listen closely to my words and correct me, if I miss the mark in any way." 10 The development of kairos from this source explains its dual meaning as an opening or opportunity and as due measure, for the shot requires not only accuracy, but also the right amount of power -neither too much nor too little -in order to pass successfully through the opening.
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In general, kairos carried a temporal connotation and has a complex relationship with the other Greek word for time, chronos (χρόνος). 12 Whereas chronos denotes a linear and progressive sense of time, kairos stands in opposition as a rare singularity. 13 One of its standard uses is thus to describe the character of a segment of time, translatable even as when or while. It is from this use that kairos comes to signify season or the times -for example in Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE), where he notes that it was "at this crisis" that "Pisander and his colleagues" arrived into Athens.
14 For many thinkers, this use of kairos took on an ethical dimension as well. If one accepts kairos as a deviation from linear and universal time, any expectation that one must match speech or actions to the character of the times presents problems for universal or absolute moral systems. It is no surprise, then, that from the early centuries of Greek philosophy, the concept of kairos was linked to moral relativism, especially that of the Sophists of the fifth century BCE: Pythagoras, Protagoras, and Gorgias.
15
For such thinkers, kairos had the power of determining the moral value of human actions: something may be good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, based on its accordance with that particular moment. 16 For example, Gorgias in his Epitaphios praises those men who "preferred . . . many times the correctness of words to strict law, because they believed this to be the most divine and universal law: to say and not to say and to do and not to do the right thing at the right time." 17 A similar lesson is expressed by the anonymous Sophist treatise Dissoi logoi: "'there is nothing that is in every respect seemly or shameful, but kairos takes the same things and makes them shameful and then changes them round and makes them seemly.'"
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Much of what is known of Sophistic thought, especially regarding kairotic moral flexibility, comes, as it did to Renaissance writers, through the works of anti-Sophists such as Plato. 19 Plato was concerned to provide an alternative to the moral relativism of the Sophists, often aligning his character of Socrates against Sophistic straw men. He did, however, confront them on (or rather in) their own terms, that is, by providing a definition of kairos. For Plato, kairos undergirds the understanding of virtue as the universal golden mean between two extremes -a doctrine embraced by both Aristotle and Cicero, as well as (through such sources) philosophers of the medieval and Renaissance periods. 20 Kairos also played a crucial role in Plato's rhetorical and political philosophy. For instance, his construction of the ideal statesman in the Politikos is built upon a notion of kairos: "For what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks but control those with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities and when it is the wrong time." 21 Plato, in the Politikos, gives his statesman the essential skill he had assigned to the rhetorician in his Phaedrus. In this latter text, Plato's Socrates details the qualities of the ideal orator, noting that only once he has "added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity" will his art be complete. 22 
KAIROS AND RHETORIC IN ISOCRATES AND PLUTARCH

5
Isocrates, a student of the Sophists and contemporary of Plato, and Plutarch, writing in the Second Sophistic, were particularly preoccupied with the questions of when to speak or to stay silent, and when certain topics should be broached, based on a consideration of kairos. In Against the Sophists, Isocrates outlines a similar set of skills for the rhetorician as Plato had, adding that oratory especially requires "fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality." 23 It remains, however, unclear how one is to determine what is fit for the occasion: when one should speak, and when silence is to be preferred. For
Isocrates, there are only "two occasions for speech -when the subject is one which you thoroughly know and when it is one on which you are compelled to speak." 24 It is "on these occasions alone [that] speech [is] better than silence; on all others, it is better to be silent than to speak." 25 However, of what this compulsion consists Isocrates is unclear; he does not, for example, tell his listeners whether a counselor ought to feel compelled to speak the truth to his king.
Plutarch gives a fuller treatment of these issues than Isocrates, divisible into two interrelated themes: the correct timing-propriety for specific topics and the timing-propriety of frank speech (παρρησία, parrhesia). 26 He too emphasizes the importance of the orator's knowledge of kairos, for "occasions arise quickly and often bring with them in public affairs sudden developments," which explains why "Demosthenes [as an orator] was inferior to many, as they say, because he drew back and hesitated when the occasion called for the opposite course." 27 On the other hand, "the man who is so moved by the events which take place and the opportunities which offer themselves that he springs to his feet is the one who most thrills the crowd, attracts it, and carries it with him." 28 Thus it is that "he who knows how, knows also when to speak." 29 Plutarch's views on kairos can be found in his Quaestiones Convivales (Table Talk) , in which he asks "Whether midst our cups it is fit to talk learnedly and philosophize?" 30 The figure of Plutarch begins by recalling Isocrates's discussion of kairos: "Isocrates the rhetorician, when at a drinking bout some begged him to make a speech, only returned: With those things in which I have no skill the time doth not suit; and in those things with which the time suits, I have no skill." 31 The character of Crato agrees in principle with Isocrates's statement, "if he designed to make such long-winded discourses as 6 would have spoiled all mirth and conversation," but suggests that it is possible to introduce at this time speech that serves to "regulate and adjust . . . our gay humours and our pleasures, to proportion the time and keep them from excess." 32 The discussants agree that "topics fit to be used at 35 Plutarch employs kairos repeatedly throughout this text, marking its importance for those wishing to give truthful and virtuous advice for the honor and profit of the hearer. This is in contrast to the flatterer, whose speech is directed at the pleasure of the hearer and who has no notion of kairos at all. The flatterer, Plutarch suggests, "sheweth himself alwaies jocund, mery and delightsome, without crossing at any time." 36 By contrast, a true friend is willing to give admonishment as well as praise, so long as "it be done in time and place convenient." 37 Discussing parrhesia, Plutarch notes that "this libertie of speech where of I speake, is the nature of a medicine, which if it be not given in time convenient and as it ought to be, besides, that it doth no good at all, it troubleth the body, worketh greevance, and in stead of a remedie prooveth to be a mischiefe." 38 Without kairos, frank counsel is no better than flattery, and in fact may even be worse, for "fit opportunity overslipt and neglected doth much hurt." 39 On the other hand, "a faithfull and carefull friend" will not "reject such occasions," but will "take hold thereof quickly, and make good use of them." 40 Such moments "open the doore and make way for us to enter, and give us leave to speak frankly." 41 In short, "opportunitie a wise and skilfull friend will not omit, but make especial good use of." 42 He repeats the lessons of Quaestiones Convivales, writing that "we must take heed how we speake broad at a table where friends be met together to drinke wine liberally and to make good cheere:
for he that amid pleasant discourses and mery talke mooveth a speech that causeth bending and knitting Gnatho gives his reading first. He interprets the statement as meaning that "it behoueth a man to holde his tunge, whan he aforeseeth by any experience, that the thinge, whiche he wolde purpose or speke of to his superior, shall neyther be pleasantly herde nor thankefully taken." 54 He suggests that, when it comes to words, "oportunitie & tyme alwaye do depende on the affection and appetite of hym that hereth them." 55 Of course, anyone well read in their Plutarch, as Elyot was, would know that this was an interpretation of kairos completely at odds with the one that a good counselor was meant to adopt.
In response, Elyot has Pasquil reiterate much of the Plutarchan doctrine of kairos explored above. He begins with examples drawn from Plutarch's discussion of table talk: "When men be set at a good soupper, and be busily occupyed in eatynge and drinkinge, though thou be depely sene in philosophie, holde thy tonge and dispute not of temperaunce." 56 This is juxtaposed with a more formal council setting: "Whan thou arte sittynge in counsaile aboute maters of weighty importaunce: talke not than of passe tyme or daliaunce, but omittinge affection or dreede, speke than to the pourpose." 57 If one takes account of the proper occasion, Pasquil tells Gnatho, then the counsel will be even more effective.
For example, "Whan thy frendes be set downe to souper, before the cuppes betwise fylled: reherce the peryll and also dishonesti that hapneth by glotony." 58 When it comes to councils, the right time comes "after thou haste either herde one raisonne bifore the, or at the leest weye, in the balaunce of thyne mary than counsaylle were but a vayne worde, and euery man wolde do as hym lyste." 61 As Plutarch had established, the affections should not be entered into a consideration of opportunity; in fact, the opportune time is when they are "out of extremitie." Rather one should only consider those things that will ensure that truthful and virtuous counsel will be most efficacious.
Pasquil and the third member of the dialogue, Harpocrates, also enter into a consideration of kairos and counsel. Hearing that his master will "syt in counsail about waightie causes" after dining,
Harpocrates declares that only after he too has dined will he give attendance. 62 This prompts in Pasquil a diatribe against the reversals of the world, which cause men to counsel after the day is done, instead of attending to such matters first thing in the morning. 63 He reflects that "after noone is tourned to fore noone, vertue into vice." 64 This discussion of the importance of the timing of pleasurable pursuits (namely dinner) and counsel, following closely on the heels of Pasquil's previous examples that juxtaposed the same, recalls the reader to a consideration of the importance of the opportune time to counsel, especially as regards the definition of virtue and vice. vse it" -in other words, to take away his interpretation of kairos and apply it to their counsel. has not yet gone by" and that they "must not throw [kairos] away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a chance when it is present and regret it when it is past." 75 The problem becomes determining these kairotic moments and the action that they require. For
Isocrates, the answer is the exercise of phronesis, or prudence. 76 The problem with the Sophists, he explains in his Against the Sophists, is not that they based their ethics on kairos, but that they had not developed the prudence necessary to utilize it. 77 He accepts, as the Sophists had, that when it comes to political affairs such as peace and war, "nothing . . . is in itself absolutely either good or bad, but rather it is the use we make of circumstances and opportunities which . . . determine the result." 78 His own educational program is outlined in his Antidosis, in which he writes that teachers are to instruct students to "combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them.
. . .
[Those] who most apply their minds to them and are able to discern the consequences which for the most part grow out of them, will most often meet these occasions in the right way." 79 He concludes, however, that "no system of knowledge can possibly cover all these occasions, since in all cases they elude our science." 83 Within the Lives themselves, kairos is a key element, determining the success or failure of the political figure in question. 84 Plutarch makes clear that the character of the times has great effect on the fortunes of men, whose temperament should accord with the nature of the era in which they live. He gives the example of Cato, whose qualities, admirable though they were, did not accord with his times: he "fared just as fruits do which make their appearance out of season," as his qualities 90 The lesson of Plutarch's exempla is that "it is the critical moment which gives the scales their saving or their fatal inclination." 91 This urge to act, whereby an actor can assert his agency against the press of chronos, often slips into a reverse relationship, where kairos forces action. Plutarch notes that Otho's policies "were forced upon him by the situation" and that, for Manius, "the crisis forced action upon him." 92 Kairos is thus inseparable from a consideration of necessity. This connection in turn gives rise to a form of temporally based relativism. Plutarch writes that Titus's "natural gift of leadership" led him to realize that he should not only rule "in accordance with the laws," but must also, "when occasion required it," know "how to dominate the laws for the common good." 93 97 Machiavelli does not employ the term kairos, but throughout the Discourses (1531) and The Prince (1532) he repeatedly uses the equivalent term occasione to denote the key moment that must be seized by a prince in order to demonstrate his virtù, underlining the importance of acting according to the needs of the moment, adopting a flexible moral stance, and understanding politics through comparative histories rather than universal principles. 98 Machiavelli draws attention to his use of this tradition in the first lines of the dedicatory epistle to Lorenzo de' Medici, in which he borrows from Isocrates's speech, Ad Nicoclem. Just as Isocrates had begun his speech by acknowledging that most courtiers bring "kings garments or brass or wrought gold or other valuable things of the kind," Machiavelli tells de' Medici that "they, that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view . . . cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments." 99 Isocrates had argued that his advice was the "the noblest and most profitable gift and one most becoming me to give and you to receive." 100 Machiavelli likewise says that he has "found nothing in my whole Inventory, that I thinke better of, or more esteem" than his gift -The
Prince. 101 The emphasis on occasione is expressed most clearly in the sixth chapter of The Prince. Like Just as with the Greek writers on kairos, necessity plays a strong role in Machiavelli's political works. He writes in the Discourses that, because the times are always changing, "to many things that reason doth not perswade thee, necessity reminds thee," and so he excuses acts, such as Brutus's murder of his sons, on the grounds of necessity. 106 As the ability to act according to virtú is based on occasione, there can be no praise nor blame for actions, and the moral valuation of such acts becomes neutral: all is dependent on "occasion . . . giving means to the one to behave himselfe vertuously, & quite bereaving the other of them." 107 It is this acknowledgement of necessity that lies at the base of Machiavelli's revolutionary treatment of the virtues in The Prince. Machiavelli writes that "it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside again, as need shall require." 108 The prince must be willing to employ the virtues as necessity and opportunity dictate, "to have a mind so disposd as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good; while he can, but to know how to make use of the evill upon necessity." 109 Recalling that, for the Sophists, kairos allowed for the redescription of good or bad, just or unjust, one might wonder how much of the famous redescription of the virtues that Machiavelli details in these 15 chapters are attributable to paradiastole, and how much to the theory of kairos that runs through them. 
KAIROS IN THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Before moving on to the effects that a revival of kairotic thought had in the later decades of the sixteenth century, it is worth noting another tradition of kairos during this period: that of the visual representation of kairos present in the popular emblem genre of the time. 124 For the ancient Greeks, kairos was not only a concept, but was also personified as a god, traditionally presented as a young athletic male with a short forelock. Usually represented in the nude, Kairos was always in motion, with wings at his heels, and sometimes on his shoulder. He often held a pair of scales and a razor, poised to strike off his forelock should he catch someone in the act of trying to seize it ( fig. 1) . 125 By the sixteenth century, the figure had become a woman, but very little else had changed. One of the most popular emblem books of the period was undoubtedly that of Andrea Alciato (1492-1550).
His Emblematum libellus, first published in 1531, went through dozens of editions in a number of languages, always including the visual representation of the concept of occasio, almost exactly as the Greeks had portrayed Kairos ( fig. 2) . The resemblance to the Greek figure, however, is not coincidental.
Alciato's description of the image begins by identifying it as "the work of Lysippus," a Greek sculptor of the fourth century BCE may not thereafter be caught by having my hair seized. It was for your sake, stranger, that the craftsman produced me with such art, and, so that I should warn all, it is an open portico that holds me. 126 The figure of Occasio develops and changes over the course of the various editions of Alciato. In the 1531 first edition, for instance, the figure is shown with many forelocks, and no wings upon her feet.
By the 1534 Paris edition, she has her wings, and a repentant man, mourning the loss of her, is figured in the distance to her right ( fig. 3 ). In the 1549 Lyon edition, she is represented as standing upon a turbulent sea, and the item below her feet has been clearly drawn as a wheel (fig. 4) . The major exception is the 1621 edition published in Padua, in which the figure is male, stands upon a ball, not a wheel, and is positioned on dry land ( fig. 5) . The text varies only slightly from edition to edition. Similar images and text can be found in other emblem books, such as that of Guillaume La Perrière in 1544 ( fig.   6 ).
Other emblems of the period emphasize the regret that will come to those who do not manage to seize occasion. For instance, Gilles Corrozet's Hecatomgraphie of 1540 shows Occasio, still on a wheel but missing her razor, in a boat and accompanied by a second figure,
Repentance, also sitting in her boat ( fig. 7) . The caption encourages the reader to grasp her quickly when she comes, otherwise "Thou shalt make penance." 127 Machiavelli's Prince in his attempt to establish the proper skills of a political counselor. He notes that history is especially useful to a counselor, whose role requires knowledge of "fit opportunitie, with occasion proportionable," as "counsellers for the most part, depend vpon the occasions and circumstances." 130 Recalling the classical tradition, Felippe adds that "in ancient times past, the Image of opportunitie was set vp in many places, that men might remember to let no occasion slip, which might be to their commoditie when opportunitie was offered . . . they painted her on a wheele, because she neuer standeth still, nor remaineth in one place, with wings on her feete, because she passeth away swiftly, her face couered with the haire of her forehead, because she lets none know her, but such as be verie attentiue to looke on her: with a raser in her hande, because shee cuts of their hope that take no heede of her but let her passe: with the hinder part of her head balde, because if she once be gone, no man can catch hold of her, and with a Maid that waits vpon her which is called Poenitentia, for repentance doth accompanie them that cannot tell how to reape profit by occasion." 131 Like Machiavelli and the Sophists before him, Felippe emphasizes that the important question is not whether an action should or should not be done -whether it is utile or honestum -but rather when it should be done:
"many things in mans life are mard, not for that they ought not to be doone, but because they be not doone in time and place." 132 History, as it was for Machiavelli, was for Felippe and others like him the crucial source for this sort of knowledge. 133 As Thomas Blundeville (ca. 1522-ca. 1606) writes in his True order and methode of wryting and reading hystories (1574), the historian gains "better knowledge of the opportunitie of affayres" of his own time by studying those whose "skill . . . causeth him to take occasion when it is offered, and to vse the meetest meanes to bring it to passe." 134 The reader of history learns that such an individual's actions are "forced by outward occasion" and therefore "deserue neyther blame nor prayse." 135 Although his relationship with Machiavellian ideas was complex at best, here at least Francis Bacon (1561-1626) also agrees, detailing in his Aduancement of Learning (1605) the political "wisedome of pressiing a mans own fortune," whereby a man may learn how "to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion." 136 The surest way to this is to follow Machiavelli's method of the study of comparable histories, for "the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argumente of Negotiation and occasions is which Machiauel chose wisely and aptly for Gouernmente: namely discourse vpon Histories and Examples." 137 The most influential adoption of this language comes with the reason of state discourse toward the end of the sixteenth century. 138 The greatest example of this new political vocabulary is from Giovanni Botero (ca. 1544-1617), whose Ragione di Stato was first published in 1589. 139 Having set out his desire to correct a political discourse corrupted by Machiavellian "lack of conscience," Botero establishes a reason of state which seeks to identify the "knowledge of the means by which such a a number of Machiavellian tactics in order to gain and retain the power they hold in the world. These practices, however, are not to be wholly condemned, for "there is not any vice so detestable, or crime so hainous that sometime carrieth not with it a shew and colour of good, and proueth not profitable to him which in due season performeth it," a lesson driven home in the chapter demonstrating that the Turk, to establish his state "hath laide hold on occasion." 147 Lucinge is even more direct in his allusion to the classical tradition than Botero, combining his Machiavellian language with the imagery of the Renaissance emblems as Felippe had done: "The ancient Romans signified vnto vs by the picture of occasion (whom they adored as a goddesse, putting wings to her feete, supported with a bowle, behinde bald, and before hairie) that we must bee diligent to apprehend her when shee presenteth her-selfe, and 
